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IN DEFENSE OF THE BUSINESS CULTURAL 
VALUES REFLECTED IN THE ITALIAN 
SECURITIES MARKETS: WHAT THE U.S. 2008 
FINANCIAL MELTDOWN CAN TEACH US 
Maria DiMeo Calvelli 
INTRODUCTION 
The argument for corporate governance reform in the Italian capital 
markets has been driven predominantly by the dual goals of encouraging 
companies to seek financing from these markets and creating a more 
attractive Italian equity market for both domestic and international 
investors. The movement has been driven by the need to: (1) increase 
investor confidence in the Italian capital markets by providing investors 
with greater protections against risks of expropriation of company value; 
(2) implement European Community (EC) directives and regulations; (3) 
react to corporate scandals; and (4) model the corporate governance 
methodologies of other developed countries such as the United States.1 
In contrast to the United States, in Italy there are few listed companies 
that are widely held. The typical Italian listed company is instead governed 
by dominant individual or family shareholders who, without owning a large 
percentage of the company’s cash flow rights, exercise control over a 
majority of the company’s votes. Often, the controlling shareholder 
exercises voting control without owning a large fraction of the cash flow 
rights flowing from ownership.2 In such a company, the minority 
shareholders’ security holdings reflect predominantly a right to the flow of 
company profits. The valuation of the initial investment in the company 
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 1. Luca Enriques, Modernizing Italy’s Corporate Governance Institutions: Mission 
Accomplished? 3, 41–42 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 123/2009, 2009), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1400999. See, e.g., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-
Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 285 (2008) [hereinafter La Porta et al., Economic Consequences]; Jonathan R. 
Macey, Italian Corporate Governance: One American’s Perspective, 1998 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 
121. 
 2. See, e.g., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate 
Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471, 486 (1999) [hereinafter La Porta et al., Corporate 
Ownership] (discussing how Fiat’s pyramidal ownership structure results in one person or family 
controlling 20% of the voting rights but only 15.47% of the cash flow rights). 
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(purchase price) is presumably derived from the limited contractual rights 
of the security acquired. Interestingly, the difference between the value of 
voting and non-voting shares of Italian corporations has been found to be 
one of the highest in the world.3 Such a price differential demonstrates the 
ability of the market to distinguish between the rights flowing from the 
purchase of one type of company security and another security of the same 
company. 
Much has been written about the different consequences for corporate 
governance resulting from different ownership structures.4 The literature 
has focused predominantly on the need to reform governance systems to 
increase the protection afforded to minority shareholders.5 Reforms are 
meant to address the imbalance between: (1) the cash flow rights available 
to minority shareholders and voting rights controlled by dominant 
entrenched shareholders; and (2) the cash flow rights and limited voting 
                                                                                                                                          
 3. See Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, Private Benefits of Control: An International 
Comparison, 59 J. FIN. 537, 568 Table 6 (2004); Luca Enriques & Paolo Volpin, Corporate 
Governance Reforms in Continental Europe, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 117 (2007); Tatiana Nenova, The 
Value of Corporate Voting Rights and Control: A Cross Country Analysis, 68 J. FIN. ECON. 325, 
327–28, 331–36, 340–41 (2003); Luigi Zingales, The Value of the Voting Right: A Study of the 
Milan Stock Exchange Experience, 7 REV. FIN. STUD. 125, 125–26 (1994), available at 
http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/luigi.zingales/research/papers/votingright1994.pdf [hereinafter 
Zingales, Value of the Voting Right]. 
 4. See, e.g., La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership, supra note 2. Note that recent work by 
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani has pointed out the need for a separate methodology to 
assess the level of corporate governance protection provided to outside investors in both 
controlling shareholder companies and non-controlling shareholder companies, and has further 
identified key features that these separate methodologies should include. According to Bebchuk 
and Hamdani, 
any attempt to assess the governance of public firms around the world should depend 
critically on ownership structure. Some arrangements that benefit outside investors in 
companies without a controlling shareholder are either practically irrelevant or even 
counterproductive in the presence of a controlling shareholder, and vice versa.  
   Because of this fundamental difference between companies with and without a 
controlling shareholder, any governance-rating methodology that applies a single metric 
to companies or countries worldwide is bound to produce an inaccurate or even 
distorted picture. 
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, The Elusive Quest for Global Governance Standards, 157 
U. PA. L. REV. 1263, 1316 (2009). 
 5. See generally Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert 
Vishny, Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation, 57 J. FIN. 1147 (2002); Rafael La Porta, 
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. 
ECON. 1113 (1998); Andrei Shleifer & Daniel Wolfenzon, Investor Protection and Equity 
Markets, 66 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (2002). See also Ross Levine, Law, Finance, and Economic Growth, 
8 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 8, 24 (1999) (discussing how economic growth is supported by the 
existence of legal systems that protect the outside shareholders); Rafael La Porta, Florencio 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Legal Determinants of External Finance, 
52 J. FIN. 1131, 1139 (1997) [hereinafter La Porta et al., Legal Determinants] (surveying 49 
countries and finding that smaller and narrower capital markets are associated with countries with 
lower levels of investor protection). 
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power available to minority shareholders and day-to-day control exercised 
by entrenched management.6 Hence, the goals of reforms in general have 
been to hold managers accountable to minority shareholders and to prevent 
or limit the exposure of minority investors to the opportunism of the inside 
dominant or controlling shareholders. 
Since at least 1998, Italy has begun the actual process of reforming its 
corporate governance. Much of this work has been in alignment with the 
corporate governance standards of the U.S. The Draghi Law, for example, 
resulted in changes to the process used for capital markets offerings as well 
as takeovers, to the disclosure obligations of corporations, to the 
functioning of audit firms, and to minority shareholder rights, all in ways 
intended to mirror the U.S. and U.K. approach to corporate governance.7 
These developments appear to be aimed at improving buyer comfort with 
respect to investing in securities listed on the Italian capital markets. 
There is no doubt that Italian corporate governance has improved 
significantly since the passage of the Draghi Law and subsequent reforms.8 
And yet, there is a general sense that the Italian capital markets continue to 
lag behind the capital markets of the U.S. and the U.K.9 As Italy has 
improved its corporate governance, these benchmark countries have also 
continued to move forward with corporate governance reforms. In addition, 
the political, legal, and business cultures of common law countries continue 
to be viewed as more favorable to the development of capital markets than 
those of civil law countries such as Italy.10 Policymakers and academics, 
therefore, continue to worry about the competitiveness of the Italian capital 
markets and their ability to attract investors. 
In assessing this competitiveness, much research has focused on the 
need for additional reform, particularly in the area of increasing investor 
rights with regard to the ability of controlling shareholders to divert to 
themselves company value apart from the value of their share ownership. 
                                                                                                                                          
 6. Compare Zingales, Value of the Voting Right, supra note 3 (stressing that there are 
economic benefits to control that corporate governance should address) with Michael C. Jensen & 
William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership 
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (stressing that the agency theory proposes that governance 
mechanisms are necessary in order to align the interests of management with those of the owners). 
 7. See Enriques, supra note 1, at 13. 
 8. See generally id. (analyzing the effect of governance reforms and concluding that positive 
changes have resulted from such reforms though there is still room for improvement). 
 9. Richard Cartey, EU Lags Behind US in Entrepreneurial Culture, EUOBSERVER.COM (Jan. 
17, 2005, 5:27 PM), http://euobserver.com/?sid=9&aid=18157 (last visited Feb. 4, 2011) 
(concluding that the main reason for the lack of entrepreneurial spirit in the EU is the difficulty in 
finding financing); Leaders: Italy’s Unfinished Business, ECONOMIST, Oct. 14, 2000, at 21 
(discussing how the reform movement of the 1990s has been ineffective as economic growth in 
Italy has been the slowest of all the European countries and blaming the lack of political will for 
this ineffectiveness); The Real Sick Man of Europe; Italy, ECONOMIST, May 21, 2005, at 11 
(discussing how Italy’s economy is stagnant and its corporate governance continues to suffer). 
 10. See generally Enriques, supra note 1; La Porta et al., Economic Consequences, supra 
note 1. 
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Many have been advocating reforms directed at neutralizing the power of 
controlling shareholders.11 While Italy’s reform program since the 1990s 
has focused on increasing the voice of minority shareholders in company 
matters, improving internal controls, and expanding disclosure obligations, 
its current challenge remains tackling the problem of the expropriation of 
corporate benefits by controlling shareholders at the expense of the 
minority. In response, in April 2008, the Commissione Nazionale Per Le 
Societa e La Borsa (CONSOB)—the Italian version of the SEC—issued a 
draft regulation (which it formally adopted in March 2010) addressing 
related party transactions, the effect of which is to provide a check on the 
power of controlling shareholders.12  
In the United States, the current fundamental problem of corporate 
governance is how to deal with the conflict of interest between dispersed 
minority shareholders and powerful controlling managers. This problem, 
which is a product of the separation of ownership and control,13 has resulted 
in what many consider to be excessive managerial risk-taking, incentivized 
by the structure of management compensation awards.14 Articles in the 
mainstream media put at least part of the blame for the full market 
meltdown occurring in the second half of 2008 on excessive risk-taking by 
corporate executives.15 Pay for performance compensation packages 
(equity-based compensation—most prominently in the form of awarding 
stock options) have been criticized for incentivizing senior executives to 
manipulate earnings and increase risk-taking in the name of short-term 
                                                                                                                                          
 11. See Enriques, supra note 1, at 8–9. 
 12. See CONSOB Resolution, 12 marzo 2010, n. 17221, in Gazz Uff. [G.U.] 25 marzo 2010, 
n. 70 (It.), available in English at http://www.consob.it/mainen/documenti/english/laws/ 
reg17221e.htm. 
 13. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 119–125 (1933). See generally Jensen & Meckling, supra note 6. 
 14. E.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Statement by Treasury Secretary Tim 
Geithner on Compensation (June 10, 2009), http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg163.htm 
(stating that “compensation should be structured to account for the time horizon of risks”); Lucian 
A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Holger Spamann, The Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at 
Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000-2008, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 257, 261 (2010) (analyzing the 
compensation of the top-five executive teams of Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns during the 
2000–2008 period and concluding that “given the structure of executives’ payoffs, the possibility 
that risk-taking decisions were influenced by incentives should not be dismissed, but rather, 
should be taken seriously”). See also Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating 
Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247, 249 (2010) (suggesting there is wide recognition that pay 
packages which focus excessively on short-term results produce incentives for excessive risk-
taking and stating “[e]xcessive risk-taking in the financial sector has played an important role in 
the major financial crisis of 2008-09”). 
 15. E.g., Leo Hindery, Jr., Why We Need to Limit Executive Compensation, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK, Nov. 4, 2008, http://www.businessweek.com/managing/content/nov2008/ 
ca2008114_493532.htm (describing how excessive CEO pay is at the center of America’s 
economic problems); Matt Townsend, Lehman, Bear Officials Made $2.5 Billion, Study Says 
(Update 1), BLOOMBERG, Nov. 23, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=news 
archive&sid=aLS5o0JQrykE (executive pay may have encouraged risk-taking). 
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gains so as to maximize payouts available from exercising their options.16 
The result was a system-wide failure to manage and control risk and to use 
risk management to inform management decision-making. 
To date, the Italian reform process has been necessary and effective, 
modeling the approach of common law countries such as the U.S. The 2008 
financial crisis, however, clearly demonstrates that there continue to be 
significant governance risks and issues associated even with the U.S. 
approach. This Article argues that, while certain reforms relating to 
controlling shareholders may still be necessary in order to improve the 
attractiveness of the Italian market to investors, careful consideration should 
be given to the potential positive aspects that derive from the existence of 
controlling shareholders. It is time, therefore, to consider whether Italian 
reforms should now focus on improving the business cultural advantages 
inherent in the current Italian capital markets system, as opposed to moving 
solely in the corporate governance direction of the U.S. and the U.K. 
Part I provides background information on the business culture of Italy 
with particular emphasis on the corporate structure of listed companies. Part 
II is a summary of the corporate reforms implemented by Italy since the 
early 1990s; the emphasis of which, in conformity with changes in U.S. 
corporate governance laws, has been predominantly on improving minority 
shareholder rights with respect to their companies. 
Part III is a discussion of the 2008 U.S. financial crisis, which occurred 
despite the fact that the U.S. had earlier engaged in shareholder rights and 
other corporate governance reforms and despite the fact that corporate 
ownership in the U.S. is characterized by institutional shareholders who are 
supposedly more inclined and more likely to monitor corporate decision-
making. Part III explores the idea that at least part of the meltdown was the 
result of uncontrolled managers who were incentivized by compensation 
pay packages to focus on short-term gains instead of long-term company 
goals. This Part further theorizes that this type of managerial expropriation 
is at least as dangerous to shareholders as the issues that arise as a result of 
the business culture of Italy. 
Part IV explores the idea that the time has come for Italian reforms to 
cease mirroring those of the U.S. and the U.K. Instead, Part IV argues that 
Italy should look to the future and focus its reforms so as to maximize the 
potential benefits that may flow from the existence of a controlling 
shareholder, including the ability of a controlling shareholder to “manage” 
management. Emphasis should be placed on this positive role and, moving 
forward, regulatory reform should seek to balance the need for changes 
which increase investor confidence and investor protections with the 
potential positive role inherent in the existence of a controlling shareholder. 
This Part further supports the existing cry for additional reforms to the 
                                                                                                                                          
 16. See infra Part III. 
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Italian capital markets in the areas of greater transparency in the workings 
of controlling shareholders and improvements in anti-fraud enforcement. 
PART I: BUSINESS CULTURAL ENVIRONMENT IN ITALY 
Industrialization came late to Italy. By the end of the 1800s, Italy 
lagged behind with an economy that was primarily agricultural. The first 
phase of industrialization in Italy occurred from 1896 to 1914 when 
universal banks, Banca Commerciale Italiana and Credito Italiano, provided 
financing for entrepreneurial initiatives in the transportation (train engines 
and automobiles) and mining industrial sectors. Even so, early on the Italian 
government’s intervention was necessary to rescue certain of these 
entrepreneurial companies. In 1911, for example, the Italian government 
rescued the entire steel industry. Until 1990, when the state began to 
actively divest itself of its corporate holdings, the Italian state actively 
controlled the economy through its role as controlling shareholder of many 
of the for-profit companies. State intervention in the economy continued to 
expand through the creation of state agencies, such as the Instituto per la 
Ricostruzione Industriale (IRI) in 1933 and later Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi 
(ENI) in 1952, which managed the portfolio of companies controlled by the 
banks. This continued intervention by the state replaced the role of private 
financing and stifled the development of the Italian capital markets. Instead, 
the state played an inordinately extensive role in capitalizing companies and 
bailing out financially troubled companies. As the largest shareholder in the 
capital-intensive sectors of the economy, the state placed little emphasis on, 
and had little concern for, investor protection. In this environment of state 
intervention and low investor protection, the economy was characterized by 
state control in capital intensive industries and private family capitalism for 
which the capital markets held no attraction.17 
The economy of Italy began to change dramatically after the end of 
World War II. From an agriculturally-based economy where large sectors 
were controlled by the state, it has now developed into an industrial country 
ranked in 2009 by the World Bank as the world’s seventh largest economy 
based on GDP comparisons18 and the world’s tenth largest in terms of 
purchasing power parity.19 Today, Italy’s economy derives in large part 
from the processing and the manufacturing of quality consumer goods—
primarily in small and medium-sized family-owned firms—which typically 
                                                                                                                                          
 17. See generally Alexander Aganin & Paolo F. Volpin, The History of Corporate Ownership 
in Italy, in A HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AROUND THE WORLD: FROM FAMILY 
BUSINESS GROUPS TO PROFESSIONAL MANAGERS 325 (Randall K. Morck ed., 2005) (detailing a 
complete historical review of the economic and regulatory policy of Italy and its role in limiting 
the growth of Italian capital markets). 
 18. Gross Domestic Product 2009, WORLDBANK, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ 
DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf (last revised Dec. 15, 2010). 
 19. Gross Domestic Product 2009: PPP, WORLD BANK, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ 
DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP_PPP.pdf (last revised Dec. 15, 2010). 
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face significant international competition.20 Most Italian corporations 
continue to be privately owned and privately controlled. There are few 
listed companies in Italy, though this number has begun to increase in 
recent years, and of the companies listed very few have shares that are 
widely held.21 The economy and business culture of Italy seems to be 
dominated by single-owner or family-owned firms.22 
Those Italian companies which are listed are typically characterized by 
the existence of a dominant or controlling shareholder—usually a family—
who controls voting power. One common model is where the controlling 
shareholder exercises voting control without owning a significant fraction 
of the cash flow rights.23 The separation of control from cash flow rights is 
often accomplished in one of three ways: use of a pyramidal structure,24 
cross-shareholding structures or dual share structures in which voting shares 
are retained by the controlling or dominant shareholder,25 and restricted 
voting (or non-voting) shares issued to outside investors.26 In 1995, 15% of 
the twenty largest listed companies in Italy were controlled by an individual 
(family control)27 and 20% of the twenty largest listed companies were 
                                                                                                                                          
 20. The World Factbook: Italy, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/ 
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/it.html#Econ (last visited Feb. 5, 2011). 
 21. Compare Companies Admitted to Listing from January 1995 to January 2011, BORSA 
ITALIANA, http://www.borsaitaliana.it/borsaitaliana/ufficio-stampa/dati-storici/listing2011.en_pdf 
(last visited Mar. 2, 2011) (listing 357 companies on the Borsa Italiana Exchange), with Press 
Release, NYSE Euronext, NYSE Announces New Contract for Dick Grasso Through May 2007 
(Aug. 27, 2003), http://www.nyse.com/press/1061982038732.html (indicating that between 1995 
and May 2007 alone, 1,549 companies were added to the already 2,800 companies listed on the 
NYSE). See also La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership, supra note 2, at 492 tbl. II. 
 22. Macey, supra note 1, at 141–42. 
 23. Enriques & Volpin, supra note 3, at 117–19. 
 24. “The separation of ownership from control” as affected by the use of the pyramidal 
structure is demonstrated by “Telecom Italia, one of the world’s largest telecom companies.” 
Enriques & Volpin, supra note 3, at 119. The ownership structure of Telecom Italia in 2005 was 
pyramidal in nature with Marco Tronchetti Provera controlling 18% of the votes in Telecom Italia 
while holding only 0.7% of the cash flow rights. Id. Tronchetti was by far the largest shareholder 
of Telecom Italia and his controlling interest is owned through a series of subsidiary relationships 
owned and controlled ultimately by the Tronchetti family through the GPI, Camfin, Pirelli, and 
Olimpia companies. Id. at 119–21. Control by Tronchetti with respect to the voting power in 
Telecom Italia is further reinforced through a voting “agreement with other large shareholders” of 
the Pirelli subsidiary. Id. at 120. As a result, Tronchetti controls 46.1% of the votes in Pirelli (25% 
directly held by Tronchetti’s holding company, Camfin, and an additional 21.1% as a result of the 
voting syndicate), Pirelli controls 50.4% of the votes in Olimpia and Olimpia controls 18% of the 
votes in Telecom Italia making Provera by far the largest shareholder of Telecom Italia. Id. at 
120–21. 
 25. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman & George G. Triantis, Stock Pyramids, 
Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Mechanisms and Agency Costs of Separating 
Control from Cash Flow Rights, in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 299–301 (Randall 
K. Morck ed., 2000). 
 26. See id. at 297–301. 
 27. La Porta et. al., Corporate Ownership, supra note 2, at 492 tbl. II. 
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controlled through at least one publicly traded company (pyramidal 
control).28 
This family or dominant shareholder control of a company is not 
necessarily bad. In fact, research shows that, on average, a family controlled 
company is better managed than one where shareholdings are widely 
dispersed.29 Such control may more closely align shareholder interests with 
those of management. A controlling shareholder, for example, commonly 
has both the incentive to monitor management and the opportunity to do 
so.30 This shareholder holds a significant enough number of shares to 
empower him to participate in the running of the company through both 
formal channels (such as by choosing management) and informal channels 
(exerting influence). Since family or dominant shareholders are in a better 
position to utilize resources to monitor managers and to influence the 
decision-making of the firm so as to maximize share value, the existence of 
such shareholders can help protect all shareholder interests from 
management abuses. These benefits of control accrue, through the action of 
the dominant shareholder, to all shareholders.31 
On the other hand, controlling shareholders in pyramidal structures—
such as those found in Italy—both limit outside shareholders’ ability to 
influence decision-making and pose the threat of expropriation of private 
benefits, which favor the dominant shareholder at the expense of these 
minority shareholders. The controlling shareholder may extract corporate 
resources from the corporation which serves the shareholder’s own 
exclusive benefit yet may have adversely effect the value of the minority’s 
shares. These private benefits include management perks such as excessive 
compensation to management owners, managerial deference, and self-
dealing transactions—such as “tunneling”32 and the transfer of assets and 
profits from a company to controlling shareholders—as well as social and 
                                                                                                                                          
 28. Id. at 499 tbl. IV. 
 29. See Ronald C. Anderson & David M. Reeb, Founding-Family Ownership and Firm 
Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500, 58 J. FIN. 1301 (2003). 
 30. Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the 
Comparative Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1651 (2006). 
 31. Silvia Rigamonti, Evolution of Ownership and Control in Italian IPO Firms 6–7 (Borsa 
Italiana BItNotes Series, Paper No. 17, 2007), available at http://www.borsaitaliana.it/borsa 
italiana/statistiche/bitnotes/numeripubblicati4839/bitnotes17.en.htm. 
 32. Enriques & Volpin, supra note 3, at 122. 
   A hypothetical example may help to clarify how tunneling works. In the 
pyramidal group . . . , imagine what would happen if Marco Tronchetti Provera forced 
Telecom Italia to buy inputs from Camfin at above market prices. This related-party 
transaction neither creates nor destroys value, because the loss for Telecom Italia is 
equal to the gain for Camfin. But Tronchetti Provera would be better off, because he 
pockets 29.1 percent of Camfin’s gain and suffers only 0.7 percent of Telecom Italia’s 
loss. 
Id. 
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political prestige.33 Where a controlling shareholder uses his control 
position to extract or transfer corporate resources for his own private 
benefit, value is diminished for minority shareholders. The dominant 
shareholder may, for example, enter into related party transactions between 
its various companies on terms advantageous to one company and 
disadvantageous to the other.34 The difference in value that is transferred 
from the minority shareholders to the dominant one may be referred to as 
the private benefits of control. 
Some have claimed that, as a result of the risk of expropriation which 
arises with the existence of controlling shareholders, the attractiveness of 
the Italian securities markets to investors has been significantly 
diminished.35 Like that of all other capital markets, the challenge for the 
Italian securities market has been to attract investors willing to purchase 
stock in listed companies while also attracting or encouraging companies to 
list shares. The ability to offer shares that enable a family or other 
controlling shareholder to retain decision-making control may encourage 
family-owned or dominant shareholder controlled businesses to consider 
listing. Attracting new companies to list is a necessary component of any 
securities market. Yet, the securities being offered must also attract 
investors to buy. 
The current Italian business culture, characterized by small and mid-
sized family-owned businesses and pyramidal structures that threaten 
minority shareholders through expropriation, has been viewed as 
detrimental to the growth of the Italian securities markets.36 Yet, this 
cultural environment of dominant shareholders also provides a management 
                                                                                                                                          
 33. See generally Harold Demsetz & Kenneth Lehn, The Structure of Corporate Ownership: 
Causes and Consequences, 93 J. POL. ECON. 1155, 1161–62 (1985) (discussing amenity potential 
such as prestige and political connections as an attractive private benefit); Simon Johnson, Rafael 
La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Tunneling, 90 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS 
& PROC.) 22 (2000) (discussing the many methods of transferring company resources to a 
controlling shareholder including one who also acts as top management). 
 34. See Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de Silanex, & Shleifer, supra note 33. 
 35. See Macey, supra note 1, at 132, 140 (providing anecdotal evidence of the same); Andrei 
Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737, 742 (1997) (“In 
many countries today, the law protects investors better than it does in Russia, Korea or Italy.”); 
Zingales, Value of the Voting Right, supra note 3 (providing empirical evidence that Italian 
corporate governance did not sufficiently protect investors from expropriation of minority 
shareholder value). 
 36. We know, for example, that countries with weaker investor protections have less 
developed financial markets. See La Porta et al., Legal Determinants, supra note 5; accord Rafael 
La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, What Works in Securities Laws?, 61 J. 
FIN. 1 (2006); cf. Disiano Preite, Investitori Istituzionali e Riforma Del Diritto Delle Società Per 
Azioni, 1993 RIVISTA DELLE SOCIETÀ 476 (supporting the conclusion that Italian companies 
competing on a global basis for financing were at a disadvantage as a result of poor investor 
protection mechanisms). 
326 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 5 
monitoring benefit, the value of which has yet to be fully discussed and 
evaluated.37 
PART II: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORMS IN ITALY: A 
STATUS UPDATE 
Italy has been actively engaged in the process of reforming and 
regulating its capital markets with the goal of increasing investor 
confidence by increasing shareholder rights. The intention behind the actual 
legislated reforms and the changes produced by this reform movement has 
been to align Italy’s capital markets with that of the U.S., by mirroring U.S. 
corporate governance standards.38 The goal of the reforms has been to 
decrease the need for state intervention and ownership by producing more 
vibrant capital markets that can meet the financing needs of Italian 
companies. These vibrant capital markets would decrease the concentrated 
ownership characterized by the Italian business environment, increase 
investor confidence, and foster entrepreneurship. 
The first step in this reform period began in the 1990s when the Italian 
government began privatizing state-controlled companies by making shares 
in such companies available to investors through private sales, IPOs, and, 
for already listed companies that were state controlled, through the sale of 
control blocks in the markets.39 This privatization was the first necessary 
step in decreasing state intervention in companies and increasing dispersed 
share ownership in these companies. Between 1991 and 1994, investment 
services and stock exchange regulations were modernized, insider trading 
was banned, and a new regulatory framework was created for takeover bids, 
all laying the groundwork for further capital market development.40 
                                                                                                                                          
 37. See Bebchuk, Kraakman & Triantis, supra note 25 (emphasizing that although corporate 
structures used for separating control from cash flow rights create significant limitations on the 
rights of outside shareholders to influence decision-making and thereby increase agency cost, it is 
necessary to ascertain whether any benefits inure to the outside shareholders as a result of these 
structures that warrant the increased agency cost). 
 38. See generally Enriques & Volpin, supra note 3. 
 39. Decreto Legge [D.L.] 31 maggio 1994, n. 332, in Gazz. Uff. 1 giugno 1994, n. 474 (It.), 
available at http://www.consob.it/main/documenti/Regolamentazione/normativa/leg474.htm? 
hkeywords=&docid=2&page=0&hits=16; Legge [L.] 30 luglio 1994, n. 474, in Gazz. Uff. 30 
luglio, n. 177 (It.), available at http://guide.supereva.it/diritto/interventi/2001/06/51599.shtml. See 
also Marcello Bianchi & Luca Enriques, Corporate Governance in Italy after the 1998 Reform: 
What Role for Institutional Investors? (CONSOB Quaderni Di Finanza: Studi e Ricerche, Paper 
No. 43, 2001) (discussing the legislative reform movement in Italy), available at 
http://www.consob.it/mainen/consob/publications/papers/papers.html?symblink=/mainen/consob/
publications/papers/index.html (follow the “Corporate Governance in Italy after the 1998 reform: 
what role for institutional investors?” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 11, 2011). See generally 
Enriques, supra note 1 (summarizing the laws and regulations relating to the reform of the Italian 
capital markets and Italian corporate governance). 
 40. Leggi [L] 17 maggio 1991, n. 157, in Gazz. Uff. 20 maggio 1991, n. 116 (It.), available at 
http://guide.supereva.it/diritto/interventi/2001/05/45043.shtml (banning the use of confidential 
information for trading by insiders); Leggi [L] 18 febbraio 1992, n. 149 in Suppl. Ordinario Alla 
Gazz. Uff. 21 febbraio 1992, n. 43 (It.), available at http://guide.supereva.it/diritto/interventi/ 
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Additionally, as an initial move to attract purchasers to these newly 
privatized companies, 1994 decrees mandated the representation of 
minority shareholders on the boards of directors of the privatized 
companies by requiring that one-fifth of the board of director seats, as well 
as one seat on internal auditor boards—the internal corporate body of 
Italian corporations responsible for overseeing audit functions—be 
allocated to these shareholders.41 The early 1990s, therefore, reflected a 
growing recognition of the need to decrease state involvement by increasing 
the attraction of the markets both to those already listed and now privatized 
companies and to outside investors. 
The main legislative reform in Italy began in 1998 with the passage of 
corporate governance legislation in the form of the Draghi Law.42 The 
Draghi Law was meant not only to apply—as the prior reforms 
predominantly did—to those companies that were being privatized through 
the disposition of state holdings to outside investors, but also to any listed 
or newly listed company. New rights were granted to minority shareholders 
in these companies and the exercise of existing rights was expanded. 
Protections were fortified by the requirement that, at extraordinary 
shareholder meetings, a vote of two-thirds of the capital represented at the 
meeting was necessary for the approval of amendments to the corporate 
charter, new issuances of shares, and mergers.43 Shareholders holding at 
least 5% of the company’s capital were now further empowered to sue 
directors derivatively (later amended in 2005 to holders of 2.5%);44 
shareholders holding 5% or more of the company’s shares could now 
request that a shareholder meeting be convened;45 and shareholders with 
10% or more of the company’s shares may file a complaint with the court 
asking for the appointment of an inspector to review the business of the 
corporation.46 
The Draghi Law also revised the role, composition, and powers of the 
board of internal auditors. As in the case of the minority shareholders of 
privatized companies, minority shareholders of listed companies are now 
                                                                                                                                          
2001/05/43415.shtml (regulating the process for public offerings, subscriptions, purchases and 
exchanges of securities and authorizing CONSOB to develop and implement regulations relating 
to takeover bidding). 
 41. D.L. n. 332/1994 (It.), arts. 4, 5; L. n. 474/1994 (It.). 
 42. Decreto Legislativo [D.Lgs.] 24 febbraio 1998, n. 58 (It.), available at 
http://www.consob.it/main/regolamentazione/tuf/tuf.html?queryid=main.regolamentazione.tuf&re
sultmethod=tuf&search=1&amp;symblink=/main/regolamentazione/tuf/index.html; Codice Civile 
[C.c.] arts. 2368, 2369, available at http://www.altalex.com/index.php?idnot=37056. 
 43. D.Lgs. n. 58/1998 (It.), art. 126(4); C.c. arts. 2368, 2369 (It.). 
 44. D.Lgs. n. 58/1998, art. 129; Codice Civile [C.c]. art. 2393-bis (It.). See Legge [L.] 28 
dicembre 2005, n. 262, in Suppl. Orginario Gazz. Uff. 28 dicembre 2005, n. 208 (It.) (reducing the 
percentage required for derivative suits to 2.5%). 
 45. D.Lgs. n. 58/1998 (It.), art. 125; Codice Civile [C.c.] art. 2367 (It.). 
 46. D.Lgs. n. 58/1998 (It.), art. 128; Codice Civile [C.c.] art. 2409 (It.). 
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also entitled to representation on the company’s internal auditor board.47 
The responsibility of the internal auditors board to focus on controls was 
also clarified.48 By strengthening minority shareholder rights,49 these 
reforms also began limiting the ability of controlling shareholders to extract 
private benefits.50 
In conjunction with shareholder reforms, the Draghi Law also sought to 
increase transparency by overhauling issuer disclosure obligations relating 
to IPOs and material extraordinary transactions such as mergers, new 
issuances, acquisitions and dispositions so as to align them more closely 
with U.S. and U.K. disclosure requirements.51 For example, required 
disclosure of ownership structure was expanded to include disclosure of all 
existing shareholder agreements,52 a legal structure often used by Italian 
companies to cement cross-shareholding relationships53 and thereby 
increase dominant shareholder control. Disclosure of these agreements 
began to provide markets with important information regarding the level of 
entrenched control in a listed company. 
Italy continued to revise its corporate law from 2001 through 2005 
through the Vietti Reforms. These reforms required that shareholders of 
listed companies be notified of their right to exercise shareholder voting 
rights and the amount of shareholdings prior to shareholder meetings.54 
Corporate charters may require that such communication (usually 
electronic) be sent at most two days in advance of the meeting. Prior to this 
reform, shareholders were required to deposit shares for five days before 
shareholder meetings in order to be able to vote those shares. The reform no 
longer requires such shareholder blocking, unless the charter expressly 
forbids trading after the communication is sent. In this instance, trading 
may be restricted for a maximum of the two day period between notification 
and the shareholder meeting. If shares are sold prior to the meeting, voting 
rights are reduced proportionately.55 As a result, participation by 
                                                                                                                                          
 47. D.Lgs. n. 58/1998 (It.), art. 148. 
 48. See id. art. 150, 151. 
 49. See, e.g., Guido Ferrarini, Corporate Governance Changes in the 20th Century: A View 
from Italy 22–24 (Eur. Corporate Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 29, 2005), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=695762 (discussing how the impact of the Draghi Laws on Italian 
corporate governance was an improvement on Italian shareholder protection, as calculated by the 
La Porta corporate governance score, from 1 to 5). Accord Aganin & Volpin, supra note 17. 
 50. See Dyck & Zingales, supra note 3, at 570 (empirically finding that before the passage of 
the Draghi Law the average value of extracted private benefits in Italy was 47% and after the 
reform the average had been reduced to 6%). 
 51. See generally Enriques, supra note 1; Enriques & Volpin, supra note 3. 
 52. D.Lgs. n. 58/1998 (It.), art. 122(1). 
 53. Enriques, supra note 1, at 10. 
 54. Codice Civile [C.c.] arts. 2366, 2370. 
 55. Id. art. 2370. For public companies, the share deposit requirement can no longer be 
imposed for longer than two days in advance of the meeting. In addition, when shares are in 
electronic form as in the case of listed companies, the deposit requirement is replaced by a 
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institutional shareholders in shareholder meetings was made significantly 
more attractive.56 
Reforms inspired by the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act were introduced 
from 2005 to 2008. The European Union’s Market Abuse Directive 
strengthened sanctions for insider trading and securities fraud and granted 
stronger investigative powers to public prosecutors and CONSOB.57 In 
addition, during this time period: (1) minority shareholders were 
empowered to add items on the shareholder meeting agenda as a result of a 
reduction in the shareholding requirement from 5% to 2.5% of the capital 
stock of the corporation;58 (2) shareholders holding a minimum of 2.5% of 
the capital stock of the company could now initiate derivative actions 
against the directors of the company;59 and (3) board representation for 
minority shareholders was significantly improved by the requirement that at 
least one director of the governing board in one-tier companies or one 
supervisory board member in companies with two-tier boards must be 
elected from a slate presented by the minority shareholders.60 Italy has also 
imposed stricter disclosure obligations for listed companies relating to the 
compensation of officers and directors based on the granting of stock or 
securities.61 CONSOB has been afforded broader powers to ensure that 
Italian listed companies comply with required disclosure obligations.62 
Lastly, at the end of 2004, CONSOB was finally empowered to regulate 
related third party transactions. 
In April 2008, CONSOB proposed regulation to revise disclosure 
obligations applying to related party transactions. On March 12, 2010, 
Resolution No. 17221 passed new rules governing related party transactions 
entered into by listed issuers.63 The regulation empowers independent 
directors, organized in committees and possibly assisted by advisors, to 
                                                                                                                                          
certification issued by the relevant intermediary attesting to the shareholder’s right to vote the 
shares. See Enriques, supra note 1, at 28 n.80. 
 56. Enriques, supra note 1, at 28. 
 57. Council Directive 2003/6, 2003 (L 96/16) (EC); Commission Directive 2004/72, 2004 O.J. 
(L 162/70) (EC). 
 58. Legge [L.] 28 dicembre 2005, n. 262, art. 5, in Suppl. Orginario Gazz. Uff. 28 dicembre 
2005, n. 208 (It.). 
 59. Id. art 3; Decreto Legislativo [D.Lgs.] 24 febbraio 1998, n. 58, art. 129 (It.), available at 
http://www.consob.it/main/regolamentazione/tuf/tuf.html?queryid=main.regolamentazione.tuf&re
sultmethod=tuf&search=1&amp;symblink=/main/regolamentazione/tuf/index.html; C.c. art. 2393-
bis. 
 60. L. n. 262/2005, art. 1. 
 61. Id. art. 16. See also CONSOB Resolution 14 maggio 1999, n. 11971, art. 78, 84 (It.) (as 
amended by CONSOB Resolution 3 maggio 2007, n. 15915 (It.); CONSOB Resolution 1 aprile 
2009, n. 16859 (It.), available in English at http://www.consob.it/mainen/documenti/english/ 
laws/reg11971e.htm?mode=gfx#Article_78. 
 62. Decreto Legislativo [D.Lgs.] 24 febbraio 1998, n. 58, arts. 91, 113–15 (It.), translated at 
http://www.consob.it/main/regolamentazione/tuf/tuf.html?queryid=main.regolamentazione.tuf&re
sultmethod=tuf&search=1&amp;symblink=/main/regolamentazione/tuf/index.html. 
 63. CONSOB Resolution 12 marzo 2010, n. 17221, in Gazz Uff. 25 marzo 2010, n. 70 (It.), 
available in English at http://www.consob.it/mainen/documenti/english/laws/reg17221e.htm. 
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provide opinions on related party transactions ex ante. There are procedural 
differences for material transactions64 and non-material transactions. In 
connection with material transactions, independent directors are to be 
specifically involved in the negotiation and preparation of the 
documentation relating to the third party transaction. The opinion of the 
independent director committee and any opinions of outside independent 
advisers must be presented to the corporation’s administrative body as a 
whole. The administrative body shall then take action to either approve or 
disapprove the resolution authorizing the transaction. In addition, the 
corporation’s administrative body may approve the material transaction 
regardless of negative opinions of the independent board committee and/or 
outside advisers if the transaction is approved by a favorable majority vote 
of the unrelated shareholders (whitewash mechanism).65 
The regulation further fosters transparency by enhancing existing 
disclosure requirements. Issuers must publish a disclosure document within 
seven days of the company’s approval of a material related party 
transaction. The disclosure document must describe the transaction, the 
economic rationale for the transaction that led the issuer to enter into the 
transaction, and the method for determining the consideration paid for the 
transaction. The requirement to disclose is also triggered if, during one 
fiscal year, the issuer enters into multiple related party transactions with the 
same related party that, when taken together, would amount to a material 
transaction. In addition, the annual management report and the interim 
management report must contain information on the specific material 
transaction, on other related party transactions (including non-material 
ones) entered into during the relevant time period and which significantly 
affect the issuer’s assets or earnings, and any change or development in 
related party transactions described in a previous annual financial report 
that has a significant effect on the issuer’s assets or earnings.66 
These reforms have translated into important developments for 
corporate governance in Italy. First, the independence of boards of listed 
companies has improved as a result of increased minority shareholder 
representation on boards, the increased role of the audit board, and 
strengthened procedures and board disclosure relating to self-dealing third 
party transactions. Second, the power of minority shareholders has 
increased through easier exercise of voting rights, the availability of 
derivative suits for holders of at least 2.5% of total shares, and the lowering 
of thresholds for the exercise of voting rights. Third, greater disclosure has 
been mandated. Since at least 1998, therefore, Italy has reformed its capital 
                                                                                                                                          
 64. Id. at Annex 4. Material transactions are those where certain quantitative parameters 
identified by the regulation, such as net assets, market capitalization, or total assets and liabilities, 
exceeds a 5% threshold. Id. at Annex 3. 
 65. Id. art. 11, Annex 2. 
 66. Id. 
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markets regulations so as to increase: (1) transparency with respect to 
information available on listed companies; and (2) shareholder rights with 
respect to corporate decision-making with the resulting expectation of 
increased shareholder protection against the decisions and excesses of both 
management and—with the passage of CONSOB’s 2010 regulation—
controlling or dominant shareholders. These important steps taken to 
improve investor protection have increased the attractiveness of the Italian 
capital markets to investors, including institutional investors.67 The recent 
reforms directed at containing the possibility of dominant shareholder 
expropriation should further positively impact the markets.68 
PART III: THE 2008 U.S. FINANCIAL CRISIS: THERE IS NO 
PERFECT SYSTEM 
Since the Great Depression, America has not experienced a financial 
crisis of such magnitude as that produced by the financial meltdown of 
2008. In a single year, stock prices had plummeted further than at any other 
time since the 1930s.69 This meltdown occurred despite the significant 
improvements in U.S. corporate governance made over the past few 
decades. 
In contrast to the Italian capital markets improvements, which have 
been focused on increasing the attraction of the market to investors, the 
U.S. improvements have focused on defining the role of the corporation, 
particularly as a body whose primary goal is to increase shareholder value. 
In an environment where institutional share ownership increased, the U.S. 
investor base changed from one comprised of passive individual 
shareholders to one consisting of investors more engaged in corporate 
affairs, more watchful of shareholder interests, and more focused on the 
goal of increasing the value of their share of the company. Since the late 
                                                                                                                                          
 67. Enriques, supra note 1, at 35–36. 
There is no doubt that the landscape is much friendlier to minority shareholders of 
listed companies today than ten years ago . . . . Although it is of course impossible to 
measure such improvements, one can go back to La Porta et al.’s indexes to see whether 
Italy’s updated scores reflect a better corporate governance framework. Starting from 
the original anti-director index, we can see how Italy’s score has steadily gone up, and 
is now close to the highest possible. 
Id. 
 68. See Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The 
Law and Economics of Self-Dealing, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 430, 453–54 (2008) (describing the 
variables considered in determining the anti self-dealing index score); see also Enriques, supra 
note 1, at 39 (concluding that although the Draghi Law had a modest positive impact on the index 
which measures a country’s risk of shareholder expropriation of private benefits, the passage and 
implementation of CONSOB Resolution 17221 will greatly improve this anti self-dealing score). 
 69. Brian R. Cheffins, Did Corporate Governance “Fail” During the 2008 Stock Market 
Meltdown? The Case of the S&P 500 1–4 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 
124/2009, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1396126. 
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1970s, therefore, corporate governance has been the subject of significant 
debate resulting from the incentive and agency problems associated with 
management action in the corporation. With the separation of ownership 
and management, shareholders—whose primary goal is the maximization of 
the firm’s value—are forced to delegate the implementation of this goal to 
effort- and risk-averse rational agents (managers) who are not necessarily 
incentivized to take potentially growth producing risks on behalf of the 
shareholders.70 In response to this agency problem, a number of best 
practices were established in an attempt to align the interests of 
shareholders with risk-averse management. These best practices include 
board independence, separation of Chairman and CEO positions, and the 
use of outcome-based compensation. 
Unfortunately, with the revelation of such corporate scandals as Enron, 
Worldcom, Tyco, Adelphia, and Global Crossing, the 2000s brought 
increased attention to the need for management accountability. Prompt 
legislative response arrived in the form of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 
which sought to restore investor confidence in the marketplace by 
strengthening the existing corporate governance model with—once again—
heightened regulation. With the increase in share prices during the mid- to 
late-2000s, it appeared that all was well again with the markets and 
corporate governance.71 The meltdown of 2008 followed. 
Many of the recently failed companies followed all the then-best 
corporate governance practices. For instance, Lehman Brothers adopted 
almost all of the suggested governance practices and even reserved a special 
place on their website to explain that it had sound governance structures in 
place, including compensation guidelines and a Code of Ethics. Why then 
the financial crisis? Many causes have been suggested, including an 
uncontrolled real estate market, the large amount of subprime lending in the 
U.S., deregulation—in particular, deregulated derivatives—and old-
fashioned greed. But underlying all these very specific reasons is a more 
pervasive one—excessive and uncontrolled risk-taking. 
Prior to the 2008 crisis, in most financial institutions, the majority of 
executive compensation packages consisted of variable, performance-based 
annual incentives delivered in both cash and equity.72 The use of these 
                                                                                                                                          
 70. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 6; cf. Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Agency Theory: An 
Assessment and Review, 14 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 57, 58 (1989) (discussing how agency theory is 
concerned with two problems, one of which is the problem of risk-sharing that arises when 
principals and agents have different attitudes toward risk). 
 71. See Cheffins, supra note 69, at 1. On October 9, 2007, the Dow Jones Industrial Average 
closed at the record level of 14,164.53. Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) History, N.Y. 
STOCK & COMMODITY EXCHANGES, http://www.nyse.tv/dow-jones-industrial-average-history-
djia.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2011). 
 72. See Felix Suntheim, Managerial Compensation in the Financial Service Industry 8–9 (Sept. 
29, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1592163 (discussing the 
structure of CEO remuneration where based on an analysis of the CEO compensation packages of 
2011] Business Cultural Values in the Italian Securities Markets 333 
outcomes-based incentives—such as stock options and annual bonuses—as 
a method of incentivizing management to perform in accordance with 
shareholder desires, was believed to align the interests of managers with 
shareholders by allowing managers to profit when shareholders profit. But 
instead, the use of these compensation systems—in particular stock option 
grants—as mechanisms for addressing the agency problem has encouraged 
excessive risk-taking73 on the part of senior executives who, while 
maximizing their personal payouts from option exercises, contributed to the 
system-wide failure to manage and control risk that resulted in the 2008 
financial crisis.74 
A problem associated with stock options and other similar methods of 
compensation is that, with these benefits, management is rewarded when 
the stock price increases, but management’s real wealth is not penalized if 
the stock price declines. Similarly, the use of annual bonus plans as a 
management incentive causes executives to focus on single-year 
performance and to incur risks that foster short-term benefits at the expense 
of long-term planning.75 As a result, management compensation packages 
have an aggressively risky impact on policy decision-making by executives. 
By allowing management to recognize the value of equity-based and bonus 
compensation before the long-term consequences of their decision-making 
                                                                                                                                          
77 out of 100 of the largest international banks in 1997 finds that CEO pay in the banking industry 
consists of four different components: base salary, short-term bonuses, stock options, and stock 
ownership resulting from either the exercise of options and share plans, mandatory minimum 
requirements on CEOs to own shares, or voluntary purchases made by the CEO). 
 73. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW 
FOUNDATION 29 (2009), available at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/Final 
Report_web.pdf (acknowledging that compensation packages were a leading cause of the financial 
crisis, particularly noting that “incentives for short-term gains overwhelmed the checks and 
balances meant to mitigate against the risk of excess leverage”); see also Jeffrey L. Coles, Naveen 
D. Daniel & Lalitha Naveen, Managerial Incentives and Risk-Taking, 79 J. FIN. ECON. 431 (2006) 
(studying the impact of executive compensation packages on risk and policy choices of U.S. banks 
and finding that CEO incentives do have an impact on risk-taking); Robert DeYoung, Emma Y. 
Peng & Meng Yan, Executive Compensation and Business Policy Choices at U.S. Commercial 
Banks (Fed. Reserve Bank of Kansas City Econ. Research Dep’t., Working Paper No. 10-02, 
2010), available at http://www.kansascityfed.org/PUBLICAT/RESWKPAP/PDF/rwp10-02.pdf 
(reporting specifically that banks with a higher risk inducing compensation structure engage in 
riskier polices). 
 74. See Suntheim, supra note 72, at 3–5 (empirically analyzing CEO compensation of major 
international banks (including those of the U.K. and Italy) from 1997 to 2008 and concluding that 
there is a “strong link between CEO incentives and bank risk taking,” that “banks from countries 
with strong regulators rely more on equity based compensation than those from countries with 
weaker shareholder protection” and that banks relying on CEO option based compensation and 
short-term bonuses performed worse during the 2008 financial crisis than banks whose CEOs 
were incentivized by holding a large share in stocks); cf. Cheffins, supra note 69, at 32 (“Hence, 
while in a majority of companies removed from the S&P 500 in 2008 executive pay was 
uncontroversial and the controversies that arose occurred in the ‘right’ companies, executive pay 
likely deserves at least some of the blame for the 2008 stock market meltdown.”). 
 75. GERRY HANSELL ET AL., BOSTON CONSULTING GRP., FIXING WHAT’S WRONG WITH 
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 3–4 (2009), available at http://www.bcg.com/documents/file 
20211.pdf. 
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become apparent, management is incentivized to focus on short-term results 
and inadequately factor in the long-term risks associated with these 
decisions.76 This form of managerial expropriation may be a reason why 
companies like Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae, and Freddie 
Mac got involved in risky ventures, such as mortgage securities, without 
adequate concern for the long-term overall corporate risk. 
The 2008 financial crisis provides important lessons regarding 
incentives in the U.S. corporate system. First, the need for corporate risk-
taking associated with the motive of corporate gain must be balanced with 
corporate risk-taking that is blind to long-term effects. Since both excessive 
risk-taking and no risk-taking can have harmful corporate results, risk 
management tools are needed to approximate optimal risk-taking behavior 
on the part of management.77 Second, pay practices have outraged the 
public as current systems do not appear to incentivize managers to perform 
in the shareholders’ best interest. Setting pay strategies that incentivize 
corporate risk-taking driven by short-term management gains without 
consideration of long-term effects has had disastrous consequences.78 It is 
evident that managerial expropriation has become a significant threat to the 
well-being of individual corporations, to the U.S. and to the global financial 
system as a whole. 
This managerial expropriation is a significant problem for U.S. and 
U.K. listed companies that are said to operate within an “outsider” system 
of corporate governance79 in which the most important characteristic is 
                                                                                                                                          
 76. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency 
Problem, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 71, 82, 87, 89 (2003); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay 
Without Performance: Overview of the Issues, 30 J. CORP. L. 647, 664–67, 669–670 (2005). Cf. 
Suntheim, supra note 72. 
 77. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. 
L.J. 247 (2010) (discussing how bank executive pay has produced incentives for excessive risk-
taking and such pay should be reformed to achieve appropriate levels of corporate risk). 
 78. Though not the subject of this article, Congress has recently addressed the issue of 
systemic risk-taking on a macro level by passing comprehensive regulations on July 15, 2010, 
which, among other things, increased the tools available to financial regulators to identify and 
curb reckless risk-taking. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). The goal of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 is to prevent future crises through the collection and analysis of 
data concerning risk in the financial system by creating a Financial Stability Oversight Council 
charged with looking beyond the safety of individual firms to the health and stability of the entire 
system. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner 
Remarks on Passage of the “Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act” (July 15, 2010), 
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg777.aspx; Wall Street Reform, 
FINANCIALSTABILITY.GOV, http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/wsr/Pages/wall-street-reform.aspx 
(last visited Feb. 10, 2011). 
 79. Erik Berglöf, A Note on the Typology of Financial Systems, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE: ESSAYS AND MATERIALS 159 (Klaus J. Hopt & E. Wymeersch eds., 1997); 
William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Comparative Corporate Governance and Barriers to 
Global Cross Reference, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIMES: CONVERGENCE AND DIVERSITY 
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widely-held share ownership. The principal challenge in such a system is 
ensuring that management is accountable to—and its interests aligned 
with—the interests of dispersed shareholders.80 Although dispersed 
shareholder interests in the U.S. have been equated with higher stock 
prices,81 the risk is that when charged with implementing corporate policy, 
management will prefer its own short-term interests to the detriment of the 
outside shareholders. 
The main characteristic of Italian listed companies and the 
corresponding corporate governance system, on the other hand, is that the 
ownership of shares in these companies is predominantly concentrated in 
the hands of dominant or controlling shareholders and shares are thus not 
widely held. In this “insider” model, managers are accountable to the 
controlling shareholders, as controlling shareholders are incentivized to 
closely follow and monitor the actions of management.82 
In contrast to managerial expropriation, the risk associated with insider 
systems is that controlling shareholders will expropriate corporate assets to 
their benefit and to the detriment of the minority shareholders (controlling 
shareholder expropriation). As a result, the types of fraud that occur in 
outsider versus insider systems are different. As evidenced by Enron and 
Worldcom, the risk in the outside system is that management will focus on 
short-term gains to obtain private benefits from executive compensation and 
then hide poor corporate performance. On the other hand, as evidenced by 
Parmalat, the risk in the inside system is that controlling shareholders 
expropriate corporate funds or opportunities for their private benefit.83 
Over the last several decades, regulatory reforms relating to the Italian 
capital markets have focused on modeling U.S. and U.K. protections in an 
attempt to move the “insider” model—a product of Italian business 
culture—closer to the “outsider” model which exists in the U.S. and U.K. 
The goal has been predominantly focused on more disperse share 
ownership in conjunction with increasing protections for outside investors. 
What the 2008 financial crisis has continued to demonstrate is that 
managerial expropriation is at least as significant a problem for capital 
markets as controlling shareholder expropriation. As a result, we should not 
assume that there is one perfect capital markets system or that one risk 
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factor (managerial expropriation) is more or less manageable than another 
(controlling shareholder expropriation). We should also not assume that the 
legal reforms addressing the management risk in outsider systems are 
appropriate—or required, or even sufficient—to address the expropriation 
risk associated with insider systems.84 Recognizing that the outsider and 
insider models create different risks for minority shareholders, certain 
academics have even begun to advocate the development of separate 
corporate governance indices for common law and civil law countries.85 
These separate indices would address the different governance risks 
associated with each of the “outsider” and “insider” systems separately and 
identify different factors that make for good governance in each. Bebchuk 
and Hamdani, for example, posit that rules facilitating voting by majority 
shareholders by allowing for vote by mail or proxy or vote without the 
deposit of shares are not critical in controlling shareholder companies, 
while rules on disclosure and fiduciary duties governing self-dealing and 
freezeouts matter more.86 Such distinctions will increase the usefulness of 
indexes which attempt to assess corporate governance risk. This attempt to 
develop a more comprehensive methodology for assessing shareholder 
protections provided by countries with “outsider” and “insider” systems 
implies an increasing awareness that the straightforward adoption of 
common law protections by civil law countries such as Italy may not be the 
solution, and indicates a growing recognition of the potential value in the 
controlling shareholder model. 
PART IV: ITALIAN CAPITAL MARKETS ADVANTAGE 
The business culture of Italy which permeates its capital markets—
characterized mostly by controlling shareholder or family-owned 
companies—suggests a different environment for the growth of these 
markets. Empirical studies on the role of large shareholders have 
demonstrated that family firms have lower agency costs and that these 
lower costs are due to the fact that family members have positional 
advantages in monitoring management and strong cash flow incentives to 
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monitor firms closely.87 Family members have greater access to operational 
and other firm information than other shareholders.88 The improved 
monitoring of top management arises from the existence of the dominant 
shareholder, a benefit that then accrues to all other shareholders.89 Research 
has shown that the presence of a controlling shareholder may result in 
improved corporate policing of management in public corporations and that 
this policing function is more effective than the wide variety of market 
techniques utilized when shareholdings are widely dispersed.90 The fact 
that: (1) poorly performing managers are more likely to be eliminated in 
Japanese firms with large shareholders as opposed to those without them;91 
and (2) in Belgian firms, top management turnover increases with the 
presence of dominant and family shareholders,92 indicates that there is a 
direct connection between the replacement of management and the 
existence of a dominant or controlling shareholder. These large 
shareholders, therefore, can play an important role in monitoring 
management and can directly benefit the outside minority shareholders by 
the exercise of control over management. 
Since the 1990s, the Italian capital markets have focused on the 
adoption of reforms that better align Italy’s corporate governance with those 
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of the U.S. and the U.K. Although these reforms almost uniformly reflect 
the better governance practices relevant to “outsider” systems, these 
developments, even if not perfectly responsive to the “inside” system 
concerns evident in Italy’s business culture, have been a tremendous 
improvement for the Italian capital markets. With its 2010 CONSOB 
resolution, Italy has made positive strides in regulating the disclosure of 
controlling shareholder related transactions and increasing the corporate 
approval process with respect to these transactions. But more work still 
needs to be done in order to maximize the monitoring role of these 
shareholders, increase the transparency with respect to the inner workings 
of controlling/dominant shareholders, and control the potential for private 
benefit extraction.  
Research has shown that management turnover in response to poor 
performance decreases when the top management of Italian public 
companies is not independent from the controlling family or shareholder. 
There is a low sensitivity of turnover to performance when: (1) top 
executive positions are held by the controlling shareholder; (2) control is 
completely in the hands of one shareholder and no other dominant or large 
shareholders are present; and (3) the controlling shareholder’s cash flow 
rights are less than 50% of the firm’s total outstanding cash flow rights.93 
This research suggests that, to realize the monitoring benefits of the 
controlling shareholder and to strengthen the controlling shareholder’s 
oversight role in connection with the problems of unrestrained management 
risk-taking, we should consider reforms that encourage: (1) independence 
between management and the controlling shareholder; (2) increased or 
minimum cash flow ownership levels to be held by the controlling or 
dominant shareholder; and (3) the development of the presence of other 
shareholders with significant voting and cash flow rights in the company. In 
addition, further research is necessary in order to understand how 
controlling shareholders exert control over management and whether more 
formal legal mechanisms to regulate such control are needed. Although 
there is room for the continued improvement of its corporate governance, 
the time has come for Italy to focus its reforms so as to capitalize on both 
the unique advantages offered by the controlling or dominant shareholder 
system and the improvements already made in protecting the investing 
minority. 
In striking the regulatory balance between, on the one hand, the need 
for transparency, disclosure, and shareholder rights and, on the other, the 
need to retain and capitalize on the monitoring benefit of the controlling 
shareholder structure, the Italian capital markets may succeed in 
encouraging the new listing of companies while increasing investor 
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confidence in the capital markets system. Although further reforms may be 
required, it is time for Italy to stress that the differences of the Italian 
business culture may also have value. Pricing-wise, a premium is paid for 
voting versus non-voting shares. In countries, such as Italy, characterized 
by companies with controlling shareholders, the price differential between 
the voting and non-voting shares has been found to be one of the highest in 
the world.94 In a controlling shareholder company, this price discrepancy 
may reflect both the decreased power to control corporate decision-making 
and the increased risk of expropriation of benefits by the controlling 
shareholders. Purchasers of these non-voting shares can expect to pay 
proportionately less for these limited voting rights shares. As regulatory 
improvements are made to address the issue of controlling shareholder 
expropriation, however, the pricing of these shares should improve; and, in 
contrast to the high-flying risk-taking actions of U.S. management 
(especially those of financial services industry leaders) in recent years, the 
existence of an engaged, active controlling shareholder comes with the 
benefit of closer monitoring of management decisions. The Italian capital 
markets, therefore, may be offering investors a different investment choice: 
securities with significant minority shareholder protections in companies 
where the actions of management are closely scrutinized by another 
interested party (the dominant shareholder), coupled with the opportunity 
for financial gain but free of the responsibility of monitoring. This too has 
value that should be reflected both in the price of the shares being 
purchased and the reputation of the Italian securities market. 
The Italian business culture may, in fact, present two opportunities. The 
first is an alternative corporate governance approach that differentiates the 
Italian capital markets from those of the U.S. The second is an opportunity 
for those investors who recognize that: (1) managerial expropriation is as 
much a risk to the value of minority shareholders as controlling shareholder 
expropriation; (2) Italy has made great strides in affording minority 
shareholders protections similar to those available in the U.S. and, with the 
passage of the March 2010 CONSOB resolution, has made progress toward 
regulating controlling shareholder expropriation; and (3) the existence of a 
dominant shareholder can actually benefit the minority shareholder. 
Although in Italy—as in the U.S. and elsewhere—the work of 
improving capital markets must continue, it is important to recognize that 
much progress has been made with respect to increasing the attractiveness 
of Italian capital markets to investors. At this point, given the reforms over 
the past twenty years and the increased recognition of the imperfections of 
U.S. corporate governance, it is time to increase awareness in the 
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marketplace of the potential unique benefits arising from investing in 
companies characterized by controlling shareholders. 
